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Abstract – We devise a new quantum key distribution scheme that is more efficient than the
BB84 protocol. By pre-announcing basis, Alice and Bob are more likely to use the same basis to
prepare and measure the qubits, thus achieves a higher efficiency. The error analysis is revised
and its security against any eavesdropping is proven briefly. Furthermore we show that, compared
with the LCA scheme, our modification can be applied in more quantum channels.
Introduction. – Quantum cryptography [2] lies at
the intersection of quantum mechanics and information
theory. It utilizes fundamental theories in quantum me-
chanics to guarantee the information security. Quantum
key distribution(QKD) is an important research direction
in quantum cryptography and has attracted many inter-
ests recently [1–13]. The best-known QKD scheme is the
BB84 protocol [1] which was suggested by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984. In their scheme, Alice and Bob ran-
domly choose Z-basis {|0〉, |1〉} or X-basis {|+〉, |−〉} to
prepare and measure the qubits. If the error rate is small
enough, they perform error correction and privacy ampli-
fication to get the final key. Otherwise, they terminate
the protocol. This protocol has been theoretically proven
secure [15–19]. In practice, many experimental even com-
mercial systems based on BB84 have been proposed [3],
most of which use photon(or weak light pulse) as qubit.
An inherent defect of such systems is that photons are
easy to be absorbed by the channel. For example, through
100km optical fiber, the absorption is about 20dB, which
means that only one percent of the photons will reach the
receiver and all the others are lost in the channel. The
arrived qubits are so rare that they should not be wasted.
In BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob are using different basis
with half of the probability in which case the qubits must
be discarded. In other word, half of the arrived qubits are
wasted. Lo, Chau and Ardehali suggested a more efficient
scheme(called LCA) [14] in which the qubits are prepared
in Z-basis with probability p or in X-basis with probabil-
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ity 1− p. By increasing p, Alice and Bob are more likely
to use the same basis, so the fraction of discarded data
is reduced and the efficiency is improved. To ensure the
security, they employed a refined data analysis. The error
rates in Z-basis and X-basis are estimated separately. The
run is acceptable if both of the error rates, eZ and eX , are
smaller than the tolerance emax.
However, we note that, the security requirement of
LCA is so stringent that the BB84 can produce key
through some quantum channels but the LCA cannot.
For instance, suppose the channel causes 15% errors in
the Z-basis, 5% errors in the X-basis, i.e. eZ = 15%,
eX = 5%. We set emax = 11%. According to Shor
and Preskill’s proof [19], the BB84 protocol is secure if
ebit, ephase < emax, where ebit is the bit-flip error rate
and ephase is the phase error rate in the corresponding
EPP. It should be emphasized that ebit, ephase are not the
same with eZ , eX . A confusion often happens here. In
the EPP, Alice and Bob apply Hadamard gate on half of
the qubits. For the qubits which are not Hadamard trans-
formed, the bit-flip error rate is simply the Z-basis error
rate and the phase error rate is the X-basis error rate, i.e.
ebit = eZ , ephase = eX . Conversely, for the case that the
Hadamard gate is applied, the bit-flip error rate is the X-
basis error rate, and phase error rate is the Z-basis error
rate, i.e. ebit = eX , ephase = eZ . The whole bit-flip and
phase error rates should be the average of the two cases,
i.e. ebit = ephase = (eZ + eX)/2 = 10% < 11%. Thus for
BB84, the run is acceptable and the key can be generated.
For the LCA, since eZ = 15% > 11%, the run is termi-
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nated and no key is produced. From this example, we can
see that the applicability of the LCA scheme is worse than
the standard BB84.
The motivation of this paper is to explore an efficient
QKD scheme which still works when the LCA is invalid.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob choose the basis ran-
domly, uniformly and independently. The LCA scheme
removes the uniformity to get a gain in efficiency. In-
stead, our new scheme weakens the independency. Sup-
pose Alice encodes the qubit in the basis b. Before sending
the qubit, she pre-announces a basis s. The two bases, b
and s, coincide with high probability and differ with small
probability. Bob performs measurement in the basis pre-
announced, then they are more likely to be using the same
basis, thus the discarded data is reduced and the efficiency
is improved. We also revise the error analysis to ensure
the security. The details will be explained below. An-
other advantage of our modification lies in its simplicity.
It doesn’t need entanglement or any other auxiliaries and
it can be applied in many practical QKD systems with
only a little software changes. So we think it will attract
some practical interests.
This paper is organized as following: The complete pro-
cedures of the new scheme are presented in the next sec-
tion. And then the security of the scheme will be proven
rigorously. At the end, the comparison between LCA and
our scheme will be shown.
Description of the modification. – The explicit
procedures of the new modification are presented as fol-
lows:
(1) Alice creates a random data bit string.
(2) Alice prepares another two random bit strings b and
c. The string b distributes uniformly. Alice encodes each
data bit in the Z basis if b is 0 or X basis if b is 1. The bit
of the string c is 0 with probability p or 1 with probability
1 − p. Let s = b + c (mod 2), the string s indicates the
bases that will be pre-announced.
(3) Alice publicly announces the string s, Bob receives.
(4) Alice sends the qubits to Bob.
(5) Bob receives the qubits. He first selects a subset
of them for error checking. For the checking qubits, he
chooses the basis randomly and independently to perform
measurement. For the other qubits, the bases are chosen
according to s.
(6) Bob tells Alice which qubits are selected for error
checking. They share everything about these qubits.
(7) They discard the checking qubits where they did not
use the same basis, and divide the remaining into two
groups–those for which the corresponding c is 0 and those
for which c is 1. Then they estimate the error rate of each
group, and denote them by ec=0, ec=1. If both of ec=0 and
ec=1 are smaller than the tolerance emax, they proceed to
the next step, otherwise they abort the protocol.
(8) Alice announces c of the remaining qubits. They keep
the bits where c = 0 as the raw key.
(9) They perform reconciliation and privacy amplification
to obtain the final key.
Remark: For the error checking qubits, the measuring
basis must be chosen independently, not by s.
The first major ingredient of our modification is pre-
announcing basis. The string b indicates the basis that
Alice encodes the qubits. The string s is what she will
pre-announced. The string c decides whether s coincides
with b or not. Alice pre-announces the string s before
sending qubits. Bob chooses basis according to s, then
they are using the same basis with probability p. As p
rises, the efficiency increases. Clearly, if p > 12 , the effi-
ciency is higher than BB84. The second major ingredient
is the revised error analysis. The qubits are divided into
two subsets according to c, and the error rates of each
subset are estimated separately. If both of the error rates
are smaller than the tolerance, the run is acceptable, oth-
erwise the protocol terminates. It should be emphasized
that for the checking qubits, Bob must choose the basis
independently but not according to s. Otherwise, the er-
ror rates cannot be estimated correctly. In the following
section, we will show that such an error checking strategy
guarantees the security of the protocol.
The proof of security. – Proving the security of a
QKD scheme turns out to be a very tricky business [15–19].
Shor and Preskill suggested a simple proof of BB84 in 2000
[19]. They first showed that the BB84 protocol is equiv-
alent to the entanglement-purification protocol(EPP) in
the sense of security. Then since the EPP is secure, so is
BB84. In this paper, the same skill is employed. First,
the underlying EPP protocol which is equivalent to our
new modification will be given. Then we will show that
the revised error analysis can guarantee the security of the
EPP. Since the equivalence, our modification is secure as
well.
We now give the complete procedures of underlying
EPP protocol:
(1) Alice creates EPR pairs in the state |β00〉 =
(|00〉+ |11〉) /√2.
(2) Alice prepares two bit strings b and c. The string b
distributes uniformly. Alice performs a Hadamard trans-
formation on the second qubit of EPR pair if b = 1 or does
nothing if b = 0. The string c is 0 with probability p or 1
with 1− p. Let s = b+ c (mod 2), the string s indicates
the basis that will be pre-announced.
(3) Alice publicly announces s and Bob receives.
(4) Alice sends the second qubit of each pair to Bob.
(5) Bob receives the qubits and publicly announces this
fact.
(6) Alice announces the string c.
(7) Bob receives c, and acquires the string b from b = s+c
(mod 2). Then he performs Hadamard gate on the qubits
where b is 1.
(8) Alice and Bob publicly select a subset of EPR pairs for
error checking. Then they measure their check qubits in
the Z-basis and publicly share the results. They divide the
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checking data into two groups according to c and estimate
the error rates ec=0, ec=1 separately. If both of ec=0 and
ec=1 are smaller than emax, they proceed to the next step,
otherwise they abort the protocol.
(9) Alice and Bob measure their remaining qubits accord-
ing to the check matrix for a pre-determined CSS code
with error tolerance emax. They share the results, com-
pute the syndromes for the errors, and then correct their
state, obtaining nearly perfect EPR pairs.
(10) Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in the Z-basis
to obtain the final key.
This protocol can be reduced to a QECC protocol and
then to our new scheme using the skill developed by Shor
and Preskill. The details of the reductions can be found
in Ref [19–21]. Here we just claim its truth and prove the
security of the EPP directly.
In the EPP, the purifying procedure in step(9) will be
done when the criterion ec=0, ec=1 < emax satisfies. If the
EPR pairs can be purified reliably, the fidelity will be very
high. By Holevo’s bound [22], high fidelity implies low
information that can be tapped [17]. Therefore, to prove
the security of the EPP, we just need to show that the
purification is reliable. Furthermore, since the purification
is based on the CSS code [23, 24], it runs correctly only
when the bit-flip and phase error rates are both smaller
than the error tolerance emax. So in summary, we need to
prove that: if ec=0, ec=1 < emax, then ebit, ephase < emax.
Let es=0Z be the Z-basis error rate of the qubits where
Alice pre-announces s = 0, similarly we can define es=1Z ,
es=0X and e
s=0
X .
In the EPP, for the qubits which are not Hadamard
transformed(b=0), the bit-flip error rate is simply the Z-
basis error rate, the phase error rate is the X-basis error
rate. Thus
eb=0bit = pe
s=0
Z + (1− p)es=1Z . (1)
eb=0phase = pe
s=0
X + (1 − p)es=1X . (2)
For the qubits where the Hadamard gates are ap-
plied(b=1), the bit-flip error rate is the X-basis error rate,
the phase error rate is the Z-basis error rate. Thus
eb=1bit = (1− p)es=0X + pes=1X . (3)
eb=1phase = (1− p)es=0Z + pes=1Z . (4)
Since half of the qubits are Hadamard transformed, we
have:
ebit =
1
2
eb=0bit +
1
2
eb=1bit . (5)
ephase =
1
2
eb=0phase +
1
2
eb=1phase. (6)
ec=0 consists of two parts: the Z-basis error rate as s=0
and the X-basis error rate as s=1. Hence ec=0 should be
the average of the two cases, i.e.
ec=0 =
1
2
es=0Z +
1
2
es=1X . (7)
Fig. 1: Comparison with LCA
ec=1 can be given by the weighted average of the X-basis
error rate as s=0 and the Z-basis error rate as s=1, i.e.
ec=1 =
1
2
es=0X +
1
2
es=1Z . (8)
From Eqs. (1)-(8), we find that
ebit = pec=0 + (1 − p)ec=1. (9)
ephase = (1− p)ec=0 + pec=1. (10)
Consequently, provided ec=0, ec=1 < emax, we have
ebit, ephase < emax, which says that, if the error checking
criterion is satisfied, the purification will be reliable. Then
the EPP is secure, and so is our scheme. This completes
the proof.
Comparison with LCA. – The comparison be-
tween LCA and our scheme is a bit confusing because
they seems equivalent. However, we will show that:
Through some quantum channels, the LCA is unable to
generate key but our scheme may work. For example,
still set eZ = 15%, eX = 5%, emax = 11%. As stated
above, the LCA is ineffective in such settings. Instead,
our scheme offers the opportunity. If the error rates re-
main constant no matter what Alice pre-announces, i.e.
es=0X = e
s=1
X = eX = 5%, e
s=0
Z = e
s=1
Z = eZ = 15%, then
from(7)(8), ec=0 = ec=1 = 10% < 11%, so the run is ac-
ceptable and the key will be generated from our scheme.
More intuitively, the error tolerances of the two schemes
are shown in Fig.1. Each point in the figure represents a
class of quantum channels. For example, the point(0.05,
0.03) indicates the channels with 5% errors in X-basis and
3% errors in Z-basis. More points a protocol covers, more
channels it can be applied in.
For the LCA, the security criterion is eZ , eX < 11%,
which covers the dot region in Fig.1 .
For our scheme, eX and eZ should be the average of the
error rates as s=0 and s=1, i.e.
eZ =
1
2
es=0Z +
1
2
es=1Z . (11)
eX =
1
2
es=0X +
1
2
es=1X . (12)
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From Eqs. (7)(8)(11)(12),we obtain
eZ + eX = ec=0 + ec=1. (13)
Let α = ec=1/ec=0, then the security criterion ec=0, ec=1 <
emax becomes
eZ + eX < min
{
(1 + α)emax, (1 +
1
α
)emax
}
(14)
When α = 1, it covers the maximum area, i.e.
1
2
(eX + eZ) < emax. (15)
which is shown as the slashed region in Fig.1. Clearly, the
coverage of the new scheme is larger than that of LCA.
It should be clarified that, whether the new scheme gen-
erates key or not, not only depends on eX and eZ , but
also depends on the parameter α. From(14), if α takes
other value, e.g. α = 2, the criterion becomes eX + eZ <
3
2emax, which covers a smaller area than shown in Fig.1.
In this case, the new scheme cannot produce key when
eX = 0.05, eZ = 0.15 because eX + eZ = 0.2 >
3
2emax. So
the new scheme is not always effective when LCA is in-
valid. However, it does provide the possibility. Thus our
scheme may be a better choice in practice.
The parameter α can be used to estimate how much pre-
announced information was utilized by Eve. If there is no
Eve, α should be 1. If Eve exists and the pre-announced
basis is used for eavesdropping, more errors will occur in
the part of the qubits where the pre-announced bases are
incorrect(where c=1). Then α will be larger than 1. By
observing α, Alice and Bob can get some knowledge about
Eve’s intercepting strategy.
In LCA’s paper, they declared that their scheme can be
further improved by combining it with two-way classical
communication. Luckily, our scheme also benefits from
the same extension. It was shown in [25] that the emax
can be increased up to 18.9% if the two-way classical com-
munication is applied. Combining with this result, the
best coverage (when α = 1) of our scheme is expanded to
eX + eZ < 37.8%.
Conclusion. – In this paper, we suggest a new QKD
scheme. By pre-announcing a batch of bases, Alice and
Bob use the same basis with high probability, thus achieve
a high efficiency. We revise the error checking criterion and
prove its security. We also compared our scheme with the
LCA scheme and show that our scheme may be a better
choice in some quantum channels.
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